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Abstract
The  philosophical  issues  underpinning  the  quantitative–qualitative  divide  in  educational  research  are 
examined. Three types of argument which support a resolution are considered: pragmatism, false duality 
and warranty through triangulation. In addition a number of proposed strategies—alignment, sequencing,  
translation and triangulation—are critically assessed. The article concludes by suggesting that many of  
these  ways  of  reconciling  quantitative  and  qualitative  methods  and  approaches  are  still  deficient  in 
relation  to  the  development  of  an  overarching  and  correct  view  of  ontological  and  epistemological 
matters, and that critical realism offers a more coherent solution, where the reconciliation occurs at the  
ontological level.
Introduction
In a recent issue of the British Educational Research Journal (October 2003) eight articles are included, 
which represent for the editors a celebration of ‘some of the best recent educational research’ (Gorard & 
Taylor, 2003, p. 619). In their editorial they comment on the fact that ‘six of the eight papers use and 
advocate combining the approaches traditionally referred to as qualitative and quantitative’ (Gorard & 
Taylor,  2003,  p.  620).  Though  the  editors  are  deliberately  not  identifying  a  relationship  between 
combining such approaches and either the quality of the pieces, or the quality of the research which their  
various authors report, they are expressing agreement with many of these authors that it is appropriate to 
combine  the two.  Indeed,  this  thesis  is  now generally accepted  by large  swathes  of  the  educational  
research community, especially as it seeks to transcend the paradigmatic divide that it has been claimed
exists between the two approaches (cf. Bryman, 2006; Dicks, 2006; Dixon-Woods et al., 2006; Koenig, 
2006; Mason, 2006; Moran-Ellis et al., 2006).
Three types of argument have been put forward to support this thesis. The first suggests that paradigms  
are essentially epistemic, and thus focus on matters that do not impinge on the collection and analysis of  
data about the world. This is predicated on a belief that the researcher’s task is to resolve those practical  
and ethical problems which prevent them from applying the most appropriate methods of collecting data,
where ‘appropriate’ refers to the particular task that the researcher has set themselves. This is what might  
be called the pragmatic argument. A second type of argument, in contrast to the above, makes the claim 
that epistemic positions are central to choices that researchers make about the methods and strategies
they use to investigate the social world; however, the paradigm arguments are mistakenly constructed so  
that either elements of each are misrepresented or the opposition between them is illusory. In resolving 
these  epistemic  arguments,  a  further  claim  is  made  that  qualitative  approaches  can  compensate  for 
deficiencies in quantitative approaches or  quantitative  approaches can compensate  for  deficiencies  in  
qualitative approaches. There are two variants of this. The first suggests that, contra positivism, variables  
should not  be treated as facts but  as ‘ficts’ (expressed in a numerical form),  which may not be true  
representations of reality, but are useful devices for warranted arguments developed by researchers who  
use statistics. A second variant suggests that intensional idioms which refer to intentional states can be  
reconfigured  as  extensional  idioms  so  as  to  allow  the  researcher  consistently  to  use  extensional  
expressions in their description of reality. This is what might be called the false duality argument.  A third 
type  of  argument  accepts  that  quantitative  and  qualitative  approaches  have  different  epistemic  and 
ontological  bases,  but  if both are focused on the same research problem and similar  conclusions are  
drawn, then the researcher can have a greater degree of confidence in their findings. This is what might be  
called the warranty through triangulation argument.
This article will critically address these three arguments and suggest that: i) epistemological and indeed 
ontological  issues are central  to the work of the researcher;  ii)  the paradigm debate has been falsely  
conceived and consequently it is possible to develop an overarching and more correct view of ontological  
and epistemological matters so that choice of appropriate strategies and methods logically follows from
positions that the researcher takes at these levels; iii) many of the ways of reconciling qualitative and  
quantitative approaches—triangulation,  alignment,  sequencing and translation—are still  deficient  with 
regards to i) and ii); iv) finally, a resolution is possible but this has to fit with i) and ii) and provide an  
alternative to iii).
The pragmatic argument
Ontological and epistemological beliefs have underpinned the adoption of strategies and methods used by 
empirical researchers. In contrast, proponents of a pragmatic position argue that it is possible to separate  
out these beliefs from the adoption of methods and strategies. Burke Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004),  
who argue in favour of this position, suggest that an appropriate justification can be found in the methods  
of the classical pragmatists, and this can be used to support both qualitative or quantitative approaches or 
a combination of the two on the grounds that research should be judged by its practical applicability 
rather  than  its  truthfulness  or  correspondence with  an  external  reality.  For  example,  Peirce’s  (1982) 
pragmatic maxim was that any theory of meaning takes as axiomatic that the content of a proposition is
the  experienced difference  between it  being  true  or  false.  Thus,  truth  is  understood in  terms  of  the 
practical effects of what is believed, and particularly, how useful it is.
There are two principal problems with the adoption of such a position: first, if criteria for judging the 
aptness of a piece of social research are determined by practical considerations, then current ways of 
understanding  and  ordering  the  world  necessarily  take  precedence  over  alternative  conceptions;  and 
second, this suggests a form of epistemic relativism where judgements about aptness are always relative 
to  particular  social  and  historical  arrangements.  Since  a  number  of  different  and  conflicting 
methodologies are in use at any one time, a belief in epistemic relativism does not allow a judgement to 
be made as to which of these is more appropriate. Furthermore, Peirce’s pragmatic maxim suggests an 
epistemological warrant for determining the truth of a proposition, and, even if this is accepted, it can not  
be reduced to the solving of practical and ethical problems in the research setting.
If this is rejected, an alternative is required. The researcher’s self-appointed task is to find out about  
something  in  the  world.  They are  born into a  world which is  already resourced,  and in  the  case  of  
methodology, this consists of a series of conflicting arguments for the use of certain types of approaches.  
A choice therefore has to be made, though of course the researcher may not be aware of all the possible  
options and indeed some options which have not yet been invented. As a result, they may only be able to 
make a limited choice, but a choice nonetheless. They use particular approaches, and draw conclusions 
from the data they collect, and in doing so implicitly claim that their version of reality is better than other 
possible versions, even if they are not immediately confronted with them. There is of course the special 
case of the researcher not believing that they have discovered the truth of the matter, and acknowledging 
to themselves at least, that they have produced a distorted version of the truth; but even here, they are  
implicitly accepting that their version of the truth is inadequate in relation to a better or more correct  
version. Making methodological choices per se means that the researcher is formulating a belief that the  
choice they make is a better choice than the one they did not make because it will lead to a more truthful 
representation of what they are trying to portray.
However, researchers may accept that they are working to a truth criterion, but then define their search for  
the truth in a way which is different from that of other researchers. Bridges (1999) suggests that there are 
five conceptions of truth (there may be more, but they have not yet been invented, or codified): truth as  
correspondence, truth as coherence, truth as what works, truth as consensus and truth as warranted belief. 
These different theories of truth are so framed that they imply a relationship between a statement and a 
referent, so a researcher can say, if they adopt a correspondence theory of truth, that a statement is true if 
it corresponds to a state of affairs in the world: ‘P is true if and only if p—i.e. it corresponds with an  
actual state of affairs or condition’ (Bridges, 1999, p. 601). Again, a researcher can say, if they adopt a 
conception  of  truth  as  coherence,  that  a  proposition  is  true  if  it  is  consistent  with  a  further  set  of 
propositions: ‘P1….Pn are true if and only if they represent a coherent, consistent and comprehensive set  
of propositions’ (Bridges, 1999, p. 603).
It  is  also possible  to  suggest  that  the  referent  in  each particular  case  is  of  a different  order,  so,  for 
example,  a correspondence version of truth refers to an ontological  state,  whereas truth as warranted 
belief refers to whether it satisfies an epistemological test to determine its value. Furthermore, some of  
these conceptions of truth allow for the possibility of a relativistic element whereas others do not. So,  
truth as correspondence would suggest that a belief in epistemic relativism is unsound, whereas truth as
consensus is predicated on a belief that a universal a-historical warrant cannot legitimately be developed.
These different theories are so framed that belief in one precludes belief in another.  Or at least this is true 
if a further set of assumptions is made that either belief in more than one of these theories results in a  
logical incoherence or that the individual holding such contradictory beliefs can compartmentalise aspects 
of their belief system so that one theory refers to one set of circumstances and another to a different set of 
circumstances. In relation to this last case, there is a temptation to say that the individual has in fact  
invented another theory of truth which takes account of the context of application and is thus acting in a 
coherent way. Even if it is denied that a theory of truth is a logical requirement of proceeding in the world  
as a researcher, or at least that there is no universal warrant for truth, this does not contradict the assertion  
that  is  being  argued  for  here:  that  in  making  a  choice  between  alternatives  that  already have  been 
formulated, the researcher is necessarily making a claim that the choice they make is better than one they 
did not make, because a denial of truth logically presumes that this denial is better than its affirmation.  
The only way out  of  this  dilemma is to deny that  standard logic,  and in particular,  the law of non-
contradiction,  can  effectively  discriminate  between different  propositions  or  in  the  case  that  we  are  
considering here between different versions of truth.
This position identifies a relation between a philosophical issue and empirical research; in the example  
above the issue is that of truth, but a similar exercise could have been conducted in relation to other  
philosophical concepts such as objectivity or ontology. It further suggests that any beliefs the researcher 
may have about the nature of the social world and even more importantly any beliefs they may have about  
how they can know it are so compelling that certain types of methods and strategies used by them are  
appropriate and others inappropriate. Thus, an experimental approach to the study of education can be 
adopted  if  the  experimenter  accepts  a  number  of  philosophical  positions,  which  are  justified  and 
rationalised separately from their instantiation in the collection and analysis of data. These might consist  
of a belief that the social world is not mediated by consciousness so that it is possible to argue that
controlled conditions replicate uncontrolled conditions in real-life situations even after they have been 
experienced by individuals outside of the experiment. Or, they might consist of a belief that a controlled 
setting can eliminate the values, preconceptions and underpinning epistemic frames of the researcher.
All  that  I  have  argued for  here  is  that  philosophical  criteria  are  a  prerequisite  for  the  work  of  the  
researcher. No arguments have yet been put forward for any relation between particular ontological and 
epistemological stances and particular types of methods and strategies for collecting and analysing data.  
This issue will now be addressed.
The false duality argument
Paradigmatic  arguments  are  predicated  on  the  presupposition  that  underlying  ontological  and 
epistemological  positions  taken  by  proponents  of  each  are  irreconcilable.  This  position  equates 
quantitative forms of data collection and analysis with various forms of empiricism, and qualitative data 
collection  and analysis  with various  forms  of  interpretivism.  The  two philosophical  positions  are  so 
conceived  that  the  one  necessarily  supports  and  rationalises  a  quantitative  position  and  the  other  a 
qualitative position, with proponents of the one not accepting the ontological and epistemological position 
of the other and vice versa. A further distinction needs to be drawn between actual practice and ideal  
method. So, any reconciliation between the two may rest on impoverished versions of each and certainly 
on versions that  are not  acceptable to proponents of the other paradigm.  A final  problem is that  the 
dichotomous paradigmatic model that underpins the argument so far may not represent all the available 
positions that can be taken with regard to ontological and epistemological matters.
However, Pring (2000) offers a viewpoint that characterises the paradigmatic model as a false duality.  
The two paradigms, equivalent to naïve realism and radical relativism, have the following characteristics.  
Paradigm A is: i) grounded in a belief in an external reality driven by immutable laws; ii) underpinned by 
a  belief  that  the  researcher  is  separate  from that  which  they  are  investigating;  iii)  predicated  on  a 
correspondence theory of truth, with a corresponding denial of alethic relativism; and iv) supported by a 
belief that problem and solution can be generalised from one setting to another. In contrast, paradigm B is  
underpinned by the following set of beliefs: i) reality is concept-dependent and that reality is therefore 
constructed by the efforts of individuals and groups of individuals; ii) there is no context-free way of
accessing that reality; and iii) alethic, ontological, epistemic and logical relativisms are not incoherent.  
Pring argues that many of these positions cannot be justified and that as a result the paradigmatic divide is 
unsustainable. It is not my intention here to rehearse these arguments (cf. Scott, 2005), but to suggest, as 
will become apparent, that dissolving the paradigm divide may also allow a dissolution of the division
between quantitative and qualitative methods and methodologies, given that such a division is predicated 
on the adoption of epistemic and ontological positions, which it is being argued here are unsound.
It is therefore worth examining three strategies for reconciling quantitative and qualitative stances. The 
first  of these, alignment,  operates at the level of method,  and a variant of it, sequencing, builds in a  
temporal  element.  The second, compensation, operates at the ontological  level  by allocating different 
purposes to quantitative and qualitative data sets because reality is multi-layered and the different layers  
require  different  types  of  symbolic  systems  to  describe  them.  The  third,  translation,  suggests  that  
quantitative  and qualitative  approaches  use  different  epistemic  frames  for  describing reality,  each of 
which has a unique logical form, but it is still possible to translate the one into the other. For example, all 
scientific explanations are underpinned by a notion of extensionality, so that intensional idioms which 
refer to belief and intentional states of individuals have no place in such scientific explanations. However, 
the development of mathematical models does not preclude descriptions of intentional states; only that in  
order to operate through the scientific method, intensional idioms have to be reformulated or translated so 
that formal calculations can be made (Wilson, 1990). I will first set out the principles that underpin each 
of these three positions, before, in a later section, arguing that alignment and translation are flawed, but a  
notion  of  compensation  can  be  legitimately  developed  so  long  as  the  reconciliation  occurs  at  the  
ontological level—a principal tenet of critical realism.
Alignment
The first of these positions, alignment, operates at the level of methods. This should not be conflated with 
triangulation where different methods, data sets, investigators or conceptual frameworks are used for the 
purposes  of  checking,  validating  or  corroborating  the  research  account.  Alignment  comprises  the 
construction of instruments that are usually thought of as quantitative and qualitative so that they produce 
a data set that is coherent and can be analysed in one particular way. An example is the use of a closed-
ended questionnaire delivered to a large number of respondents with, in addition, a focus group or groups, 
members of which conform to the sampling procedures used for the questionnaire. The subsequent data  
set is aligned because similar questions are asked of each set of respondents (questionnaire and focus-
group); however, those questions demand more in-depth answers at the second stage than at the first. The 
procedure is asynchronous, with the former preceding the latter (cf. Weyers, 2006).
A further attempt at combining the two approaches involves various forms of sequencing, so that, for 
example, quantitative methods and approaches are used to identify cases for deeper investigation; or in 
reverse, qualitative methods and approaches are used to determine constructs that are then sequentially 
used in a qualitative way. For example, Siraj-Blatchford et al., (2002) in their Effective Provision of Pre-
school Education (EPPE) project collected a range of quantitative data about children, their families and 
their pre-school centres in relation to 3000 aged three children in 141 pre-schools across England, and 
then used this data set to identify twelve effective pre-school settings for intensive, in-depth qualitative 
case study. This type of sequencing can be extended so that a cyclical mix is attempted, and this is where 
quantitative and qualitative methods are used in a cyclical fashion so that there is a qualitative dimension  
to the first cycle of research in order to map out the setting. In the second cycle this qualitative dimension  
is reconstructed as a quantitative dimension to allow examination of larger populations. In the third cycle,
the quantitative dimension is tested in a small number of representative cases to confirm its validity.
Compensation
Whereas alignment seeks to reconfigure the different instruments, normally categorised as quantitative  
and qualitative, so that a database can be constructed which allows a coherent and consistent analysis to 
be made, compensation focuses on the development of different instruments and analytical techniques,  
again normally categorised as quantitative and qualitative, for examining the different levels or layers of
social reality. Olsen (1996) provides an example of this approach in her study of grain markets in India, in  
which quantitative and qualitative data were collected to examine respectively the macro and micro levels  
of these markets, and where retroductive modes of inference were used to identify what must have been 
the case  in  order  to  bring about  the  observed events.  Pring (2000,  p.  259)  offers  a  justification  for 
compensation,  when  he  argues  that  quantitative  approaches  are  appropriate  where  the  purpose  is  to 
examine the generalisability of objects and those structural forms which enable and constrain agents’ 
activities,  and qualitative approaches are appropriate where the purpose is to examine agents’ unique 
intentions and beliefs or their ‘subjective meanings’. If the object of study is an aspect of social life, then 
both types of approaches have to be utilised for a full or complete account to be developed. The one  
approach compensates for the inadequacies at the methodological level of the other.
Nash (2005) provides a different approach in that he seeks to connect the two processes at the ontological  
level by developing a three-fold hierarchical model of structure, disposition and practice and then linking 
the three levels. His model combines statistical analysis of structural properties of objects with the use of  
qualitative  approaches  to  explain  causal  relations  between  interacting  objects  and  states  of  being.  
However,  he acknowledges that  statistical  positivism,  which he argues provides a realistic picture of  
reality in that ‘there is no obstacle to the identification of systematic patterns of a kind that will allow the  
possibility of  empirical  controls  for  the  purposes  of  scientific  enquiry’  (Nash,  2005,  p.  187),  cannot 
provide an adequate account of causal relations. I have suggested elsewhere (Scott, 2005, 2006) that both
these approaches underplay epistemological transitivity and ontological emergence; that a new dualism 
between  structure  and  agency  is  created;  and  that  inevitably  intensionality  and  extensionality  are 
conflated with the consequence that some meaning is logically bound to be lost.
Translation
The third attempt to reconcile qualitative and quantitative approaches, translation, allocates each of them 
to  different  epistemic  frames  with  different  logical  structures.  A  distinction  is  also  made  between  
extensionality  and  intensionality,  so  that  in  order  for  there  to  be  a  reconciliation  between  the  two 
approaches  intensional  idioms  have  to  be  translated  or  reconfigured  as  extensional  idioms.  If  it  is  
accepted that educational researchers have to engage with ontological issues, and more precisely with the 
relationship between structure and agency which characterises social life, then explanations have to in 
part refer to beliefs, intentions, emotions and the like, and furthermore are contingent on lay accounts 
given by participants. Radical behaviourist research programmes have sought to by-pass such inner states 
and accounts of them by social actors, and have treated indigenous factors as irrelevant to social science  
explanations. In addition, those factors are not just the subject matter of social science but may also be  
implicated in subsequent accounts of social life. These beliefs and interpretations in short constitute what 
Giddens (1984) has described as the double hermeneutic, which though he accepts may allow structures
and routines of social life to remain relatively stable, always has the potentiality for instability.  Thus 
intensional idioms referring as they do to these inner states are integral to complete explanations of social  
life.
Extensionality, in contrast, is fundamental to standard logic, and may be defined as ‘any two expressions  
true of the same objects, i.e. having the same extension,’ being  ‘substituted freely for one another without 
changing the truth of the larger context’ (Wilson, 1990, p. 387). Extensionality therefore refers to the 
reference of an expression and not its meaning. Since intensional expressions such as ‘he believes that…’.
and ‘he wishes that….’. reflect the meaning of the proposition, then they have no place in standard logic.  
Mathematical modelling reflects the principles established in standard logic and thus is only concerned  
with extensionality. However, translation is possible if intensional idioms are reconfigured as extensional 
idioms; and this provides a way of linking quantitative and qualitative approaches; though the bias in
this linkage is towards the quantitative with a relative neglect of the qualitative.
A variant on the translation argument is developed by Olsen and Morgan (2004). The first move they 
make  is  to  disentangle  method  from methodology,  and  in  particular  to  separate  out  the  method  of 
analytical statistics from the methodology of empiricism. For them, the use of analytical statistics is not  
necessarily underpinned by an empiricist philosophy, and furthermore, the data collected for the purposes 
of  statistical  modelling  are  fictive  rather  than  factual.  However,  they  can  contribute  to  a  correct  
explanation of social events and processes if they are understood as raw data yet to be interpreted, and it  
is this process of interpretation which allows their productive use in warranted arguments built up by 
researchers. So, for example, ethnic data (expressed in mathematical form) may be used to characterise a 
population,  where it  is  accepted that  not  every case represents a true description of that  individual’s  
ethnicity.  However,  though  the  aggregate  of  all  these  data  is  literally  fictitious,  the  subsequent  
interpretation of these data, including their fictitious nature, can contribute to a more complete picture of 
reality.
Each of these ways of combining qualitative and quantitative approaches (alignment, compensation and 
translation)  is  problematic.  Alignment  or  sequencing  suggests  that  qualitative  and  quantitative 
instruments can be reconfigured or used in combination over time so that the subsequent data set that is  
produced can be analysed in a consistent way. However, the use of these strategies cannot resolve the  
quantitative-qualitative  divide  because  they  operate  at  the  level  of  method  and  as  a  consequence,  
epistemological and ontological concerns are neglected. Compensation,  as will be suggested below, can 
provide a basis for combining the two approaches so long as the reconciliation occurs at the ontological  
level. Translation, on the other hand, is deficient as a strategy because inevitably the reconfiguration of  
either element of the data set, so that it conforms to the other, logically results in some meaning being
lost.  Before  I  suggest  a  solution,  a  further  strategy  is  examined,  where  the  claim  is  made  that  a  
reconciliation  between  quantitative  and  qualitative  approaches  does  not  require  a  resolution  at  the 
epistemological and ontological levels, but the use of both types of methods and strategies in combination 
provides more certainty about the aptness and validity of the research account.
The warranty through triangulation argument
The third argument for resolving the quantitative/qualitative dilemma takes the form of developing a  
warranty through triangulation.  The principle  of  triangulation  rests  on  the assumption  that  particular 
events are being investigated and that if they can be investigated in a number of different ways and those 
different ways concur, then the researcher may then believe that their account is a truer description of 
those  events.   This  is  an  adaptation  of  the  scientific  use  of  the  term because  in  trigonometry  and 
elementary geometry it is the process whereby a distance to a point can be calculated by working out the  
length of one side of a triangle and measuring the angles and sides of the triangle formed by that point  
and two other reference points. Here, an unknown is calculated from measurements taken from different 
points  to  the  object.  There  is  an  actual  relationship  (this  is  an  ontological  matter),  but  for  reasons 
connected  with  the  observer’s  embeddedness  in  the  world  (this  is  an  epistemological  issue),  those 
observers have to use a number of indirect methods and then infer from their coincidence or otherwise 
what the actual relationship is. Triangulation then in educational research is frequently used to plot a path  
to an unknown (the state of being in the world which the researcher wishes to describe) through the use of  
two or more indirect strategies which may or may not coincide. If they do, then the investigator can be 
more certain that their description is accurate. The underpinning principle is that the different types of 
activity are equally valuable.
Denzin (1970) has identified four types of triangulation. The first of these is data triangulation, where 
different data sets are collected at different times, with different samples, and in different contexts, and  
compared.  An  assumption  is  made  that  these  different  data  sets  are  comparable,  in  order  for  the  
confirming or disconfirming process to be a valid one. And in order for that confirming or disconfirming  
process to take place a number of conditions logically need to be fulfilled. First, the object that is the  
focus of the research needs to be the same in both cases, because if the two data sets refer to different  
objects, the comparison between them is invalid. Second, this form of triangulation suggests that there is a 
correct description of the object which can be better made through the collection of two data sets rather 
than one; and even if it is accepted that both data sets are fallible descriptions of reality, more than one
fallible data set is likely to provide less uncertainty than one. No certainty is being argued for here, but  
only that two is better in a probabilistic sense than one. Third, that both data sets are equally fallible  
because  if  they  were  not  then  different  values  would  have  to  be  attached  to  each  in  order  for  the 
comparison to be made. This can be put in a different way: if D1 (where D refers to a data set) has a  
greater correspondence with the object of investigation than D2, then more credence should be given
to D1 than to D2 in the confirming and disconfirming process. However, the empirical researcher has no  
way of allocating different values to the two or more data sets, and thus in practice has to treat each of the 
data sets as of equal value.
The second type  is  investigator triangulation,  where more than one data collector/  analyst  is  used to  
confirm or disconfirm the findings of the research. This type of triangulation can be used at the stages of 
research design, data collection and data analysis. A different type of triangulation is in operation here 
because  the  investigator  is  now dealing  with  particular  activities  which  resulted  in  a  data  set  being 
produced. The object of triangulation is therefore the datum rather than the data set; however, the same 
problem is evident, which is that in practice both or more than two data collection or analysis incidents  
have to be treated as of equal value in order for the comparison to be made, whereas, since the use of  
triangulation implies fallibility, there is no assurance that the two or more observers are equally fallible.
The third type is theoretical triangulation, where more than one theoretical position is used in interpreting  
the data. This form of triangulation may be understood as a pre- or post-theoretical activity. In the first  
case,  the  design  of  the  study  comes  directly  from  a  pre-conceived  theoretical  framework,  such  as 
ontological feminism or critical realism; and in the second case, data collection takes place without a  
preconceived theoretical framework (cf.  Glaser & Strauss, 1967),  with a theoretical  framework being 
imposed on the data post-hoc which emanates from the data themselves or from a position that has not  
originated from those data. In either of these two cases, triangulation cannot be straightforward because 
an assumption is being made that there are equally valid and different ways of describing reality which 
are incommensurable and thus cannot be compared; and this logically follows from the assertion that 
there are different theoretical positions that one can take that refer to the same aspect of reality.  The  
comparison in this case is therefore not directly a comparison at all, but a transformative process which 
produces and is designed to produce a different theoretical synthesis.
Denzin’s (1970) fourth type is methodological triangulation, where strategies or methods are mixed to 
confirm, disconfirm or corroborate the one against the other. As Hammersley and Atkinson (1995, p. 232) 
suggest,  this  form of  triangulation  cannot  determine  the  correctness  of  the  inferences  made  by  the 
researcher  because  even  if  concurrence  is  established,  it  may  be  that  both  inferences  from the  two 
different data sets are wrong ‘as a result of systematic or even random error’. Thus to draw the conclusion  
that two different data sets, or two different investigators, or two different strategies/methods can provide 
greater certainty about the eventual conclusions that are drawn is misplaced. Massey (1999) makes a 
number of other claims about triangulation. The first of these is that triangulation assumes a single end 
point, a correct description of reality, which can be accessed via a number of indirect methods, and that  
therefore multiple descriptions of the same object are incoherent. The second of these is that if a method  
or  strategy is  used,  an  assumption  is  made  that  this  can  lead  to  true  propositions  being  produced.  
However, if another strategy or method is then used to confirm or disconfirm the truth of the first, it  
would have to have the same truth value, and would therefore be redundant. Again, if an assumption is  
made that the first set of strategies and methods was inadequate as a producer of true propositions,
then likewise the use of another strategy or method which again may be flawed cannot result  in the  
identification of any inadequacies that may exist in the first set of strategies and methods. The third claim 
is that different methods and strategies may have different philosophical premises and if they do then the 
comparison between them is invalid.
An example from an actual research project can serve to illustrate these problems with triangulation. 
Blatchford et al (2003) focussed on classroom size effects. A range of methods was used and a number of 
methodological claims were made; for example, ‘(q)uite deliberately, the aim was to marry aspects of  
systematic observation (which emphasises the objectivity of the data), with professional and interpretative
judgements by field workers (who were experienced teachers)’ (Blatchford  et al.,  2003, p. 715). Two 
methods  are  being  assessed  for  their  objectivity  here.  The  first  is  systematic  observation,  which  is  
presumed  to  be  objective  because  the  categories  that  make  up  the  coding  frame  are  pre-set,  the 
researchers are trained in their capacity to recognise an instance of a behaviour that conforms to an item 
in the schedule, and inter-rater or inter-observer reliability protocols are rigorously applied. The purpose
here is to eliminate professional judgement or interpretation by the observers or researchers, and thus  
fulfil  one  requirement  of  objectivity,  which  is  that  the  personal  biases  of  these  observers  are  not  
significantly  implicated  in  the  production  of  a  description  about  what  was  being  observed.  This  is 
deliberately compared with professional and interpretative judgements by field workers about the topic in 
hand, which  per se  is  deemed not to be objective.  However, this is  complicated by the fact  that  the 
research team have decided that an even better picture of what was happening could be obtained by a 
comparison  between the objective and non-objective data  sets.  If  the  non-objective data  set  is  to  be 
influential and form part of the representation of reality, then at least in principle it must be allowed a role  
in amending and correcting the objective data set. Otherwise there is no point in making the comparison.
Furthermore,  if  the non-objective data are merely being collected to confirm or at  least  to allow the 
research team greater confidence in the objective data, then the objective data, it is suggested, may be 
flawed in some yet to be identified way. But this is clearly not what is being argued for. What in fact is 
being argued for is that onemethod has a number of qualities which allow it to be more objective and thus  
better at its task, which is to allow an analysis of the data to be made. If the researcher’s aim is to produce 
an accurate view of reality, and epistemological objectivity (never perfect, but an aspiration nevertheless) 
is  defined  as  a  prerequisite  of  providing  this  accurate  picture,  and  the  researcher  is  comparing  two 
different data sets, then logically they should give greater credence to the more objective at the expense of  
the less objective. If these data sets concur, then they can only conclude that the less objective data set  
was  in  fact  more  objective  than  they originally  thought  it  was.  The  attempt  at  triangulation  in  this  
particular case has failed, and this is in part because triangulation as a device cannot deliver what it  
promises, and thus cannot provide a solution to the quantitative/qualitative dilemma.
A critical realist resolution
The  pragmatic  or  a-epistemic  resolution  makes  a  number  of  false  assumptions.  First,  methods  and 
strategies used by empirical researchers need not have any direct relationship to epistemic and ontological  
frames  developed  by  philosophers.  Second,  decisions  about  methods  and  strategies  can  be  made  in 
relation to the research problem, without reference to the type of knowledge being produced and the view 
of reality that it espouses. I have suggested that philosophical concerns are central to decisions about  
methods and strategies, and in particular about how judgements can be made of the aptness of particular  
research  accounts.  Critical  realism,  however,  in  opposition  to  empiricist  and  positivist  perspectives,  
makes an assumption that the resolution has to occur at the ontological level, though no argument is made 
that absolute knowledge of this ontological framework is possible. If this were so, then the researcher  
would be committed to the epistemic fallacy where ontology and epistemology are conflated (cf. Bhaskar,  
1979, 1989). 
Indeed, critical realism is realist and critical for two reasons: objects in the world, and in particular social  
objects, exist whether the observer or researcher is able to know them or not; and secondly, knowledge
of these objects is always fallible because any attempts at describing them needs to take account of the  
transitive  nature  of  knowledge.  This  position  therefore  avoids  radical  constructivist  and  anti-realist 
assumptions  that  reality  only  exists  by  virtue  of  the  active  creation  of  the  individual  observer—a 
solipsistic  position.  Critical  realism then  has  a  number  of  distinctive  features:  i)  ‘a  revindication  of 
ontology, as distinct from’ but ‘(ultimately containing) epistemology’ (Bhaskar & Lawson, 1998, p. 5); ii)  
‘a distinction between the domain of the real, the actual and the empirical and a critique of the reduction 
of the real to the actual in “actualism” and then to the empirical in “empirical realism”’ (Bhaskar & 
Lawson, 1998, p. 5–6); iii) a belief that objects and generative mechanisms in the world have causal  
powers which may or may not be exercised, but still exist independently of human perception or of the  
individual’s  ability to know them;  iv)  a distinction between the transitive world of knowing and the 
intransitive world of being;  v)  a belief that  the social  world is  stratified, incorporates mechanisms at  
different levels and elements of these mechanisms cannot be reduced to those of the level from which  
they emerged; vi) a view therefore that objects have emergent properties which interact with each other  
and as a result new properties are created or emerge from old combinations of objects; and finally, vii) the 
designation of the relation between structure and agency as the key framing device at the ontological 
level.
If it is suggested that this relation is not central to an understanding of the social world, two arguments  
can serve to counter this.  First,  all  empirical  researchers or observers of the world make ontological  
assumptions and thus it is incumbent on those researchers/observers to foreground such issues so that they 
can choose the most appropriate methods for their enquiry. Second, every social situation embodies
assumptions about the ability or otherwise of individuals to act in the world in the context of structural or 
situational  enablements  or  constraints  (Cruikshank,  2002).  However,  there  is  a  need  to  avoid 
understandings of the relation between the two which in Archer’s (1990) terms lead to upward, downward  
or central conflation, so that agency and structure are granted independent powers even as they work on 
each other. Furthermore, this suggests that complete explanations of social events and processes cannot 
be reduced to the intentions of agents without reference to structural properties or to structural forms  
without  reference  to  the  intentions  and  beliefs  of  agents.  Methodologically,  this  implies  that  any 
investigation can only take place at the intersection or vertex of agential and structural objects, and thus  
indicators that
researchers use have to reflect this close relationship between the two.
If  this  is  accepted,  then  critical  realism  has  significant  implications  for  a  resolution  of  the  
quantitative/qualitative  divide.  Any strategies  and methods  that  are  used can  only be  chosen  if  they 
conform to this overarching frame, so that accounts which focus on either structures or agents to the  
exclusion of the other cannot account for the totality of the social experience, and it is the interaction  
between the two which needs to be the focus of the research. I have already suggested that quantitative
approaches and qualitative approaches are different symbolic systems, with different logical forms, for  
describing the properties of objects; however, if each is focused on different properties of social objects,  
then it is possible to reconcile them. A mathematical or statistical explanation may be appropriate if the 
property of the object can be expressed extensionally; and likewise a qualitative approach is appropriate if  
the property can be expressed intensionally.  This precludes translating the one into the other because 
whichever way the reconfiguration is carried out, a neglect of the other is bound to occur. A notion of 
compensation,  however,  can  still  be  retained,  where  the  use  of  both  approaches  is  necessary  for  a  
complete  explanation  of  the  social  setting  to  be  made.  The  reconciliation  therefore  occurs  at  the  
ontological level and the focus of investigation is on the vertex of agential and structural objects, or the  
intersection between the different levels or layers of social reality.
A detailed philosophical rationale for a critical realist stance and its distinctiveness from empiricist and 
radical relativist stances must lie outside the scope of this article, as does a full explanation of the relation  
between ontology and epistemology. However, what this article has sought to do is to provide a rationale  
for combining quantitative and qualitative data sets, methods and analytical frames, and locating this at 
the ontological level. To do otherwise is either to restrict the focus of research to the empirical, with all its  
concomitant weaknesses (cf. Bhaskar, 1979; Archer, 1990), or to limit research to textual exegesis. With  
the former, thought and reality are conflated, so that, as Sayer (1992, p. 47) argues: ‘(t)he illusion of the  
appeal to facts in popular discourse involves collapsing statements into their referents, thought objects 
into  real  objects.  It  thereby appears  to  appeal  to  the  facts  themselves,  the  way the  world  is,  in  an 
unmediated fashion, but is actually an appeal to a particular way of talking about the world in some  
conceptual system…’. With the latter, reality is collapsed in reverse fashion into text. The alternative,  
critical realism, paying careful attention to the emergent but real nature of the world and equally to the 
transient nature of how it can be known, does allow the possibility of making statements about the nature 
of reality, though these statements are qualified in a number of distinctive ways, and further to this, it
does suggest a means for resolving the quantitative–qualitative divide, the focus of this article.
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